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ABSTRACT: In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neu-
robiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as pre-
sented in (Koch, 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that 
neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence 
of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of ruling over matter independently of the causal past. But what, then, can free will be? We 
propose a compatibilist account that resonates well with neurobiology and physics, and that highlights that free will comes in 
degrees — degrees which vary with the conscious grasp the ‘free’ agent has over his actions. Finally, we analyze the well-known 
Libet experiment on free will through the lens of our model. We submit this interdisciplinary investigation as a typical case of 
naturalized philosophy: in our theorizing we privilege assumptions that find evidence in science, but our conceptual work also 
suggests new avenues for research in a few scientific disciplines.
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RESUMEN: En este artículo estudiamos la cuestión del libre albedrío desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar, combinando filoso-
fía, neurobiología y física. Comenzamos revisando hallazgos relevantes en neurobiología acerca del funcionamiento del cerebro, en 
especial los presentados en (Koch, 2009); estos resultados son evaluados en relación con la física del (in)determinismo. Tales hallaz-
gos en biofísica parecen indicar que los procesos neuronales no son de naturaleza cuántica, sino clásica. De aquí concluimos que hay 
poco apoyo a la existencia de una ‘mente’ inmaterial, capaz de gobernar la materia independientemente del pasado causal. Pero, ¿en 
qué puede consistir entonces el libre albedrío? Planteamos una propuesta compatibilista que concuerda con la neurobiología y la fí-
sica, y en la que se destaca que el libre albedrío se da en grados, dependiendo de la comprensión consciente que el agente ‘libre’ tenga 
de sus acciones. Finalmente, analizamos el famoso experimento de Libet sobre el libre albedrío desde la perspectiva de nuestro mo-
delo. Presentamos esta investigación interdisciplinar como un ejemplo típico de filosofía naturalizada: en nuestro teorizar privilegia-
mos asunciones con apoyo en la evidencia científica, aunque nuestro trabajo conceptual también sugiere nuevos caminos para la in-
vestigación en varias disciplinas científicas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: libre albedrío; consciencia; compatibilismo; neurociencia; determinismo; experimento de Libet; filosofía 
naturalizada; mecánica cuántica.
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1. Introduction
The belief that we are free-willed people, proudly capable of choosing between alterna-
tive options almost whenever we want —say between now lifting my left hand, or not do-
ing so— is so deeply embedded in humans that most of them believe that questioning free 
will is not even a serious pass-time. Interestingly enough, a handful of philosophers and sci-
entists camp on the opposite position, and believe that free will is the ultimate chimera to 
combat, the last illusion of human ‘exceptionality’ to be reduced to smithereens, just as Co-
pernicus, Darwin, Freud and others did with other illusions.
In philosophy, the debate on free will is millennia-old; almost all philosophers of re-
nown have expressed their thoughts on it. Two typical and opposing positions in philos-
ophy are libertarianism and hard determinism (for general works focusing on philosophy, 
cf. e.g. Pereboom, 1997; Walter, 2001; Dennett, 2003; Watson, 2003; Kane, 2005, 2012; 
Mele, 2009; Fischer et  al., 2007; Griffith, 2013). In essence, libertarians believe that we 
have a free will and that free will is incompatible with determinism; hard determinists on 
the other hand assume that physical or nomological determinism rules out free will. De-
terminists often conceive of the universe as a mechanical clockwork in which each particle 
and each system, be it a photon, atom or neuron, is bound by laws of nature to behave in a 
way that is predetermined, fixed, since the Big-Bang. Since our brain, the seat of our will, is 
in the end a physical and a biological system, and since natural science leaves no room for 
free will, or so it seems to the hard determinist, humans only feel free in an illusory manner. 
There is a third, popular, position, termed compatibilism, which states that free will and 
determinism are not in contradiction. For reasons explained below, the model of free will 
we will favour in this article is compatibilist.
In neurobiology, a number of well-known and highly relevant experiments related to 
free will exist, of which the most famous is Libet’s experiment (Libet, 1985); but a consid-
erable amount of other sophisticated investigations have been conducted, both on humans 
and animals (cf. e.g. Heisenberg and Wolf, 1984; Koch, 1999, 2009; Walter, 2001; Maye 
et  al., 2007; Soon et  al., 2008; Brembs, 2011; Stern, 2017). Reading these works confers 
the definite impression that neuroscientists (understandably) often draw conclusions from 
their experiments without a full knowledge of either the philosophical debate or of the 
physics debate on the matter. Sometimes they discard the philosophical debate as outdated 
and superfluous (see e.g. Koch, 2009; Brembs, 2011), advocating for instance the construc-
tion of a ‘scientific concept of free will as a biological trait’ (Brembs, 2011).
Here we embrace the point of view that a better understanding of free will, notably 
the high-level type of free will necessary for moral responsibility, needs to involve, to the 
least, the disciplines of neurobiology, philosophy and physics. In physics, too, the question 
of free will is highly debated (cf. e.g. the recent article by Nobel laureate Gerard ‘t Hooft 
(2017)), and relates to the determinism versus indeterminism controversy in the quantum 
realm12(cf. e.g. Wuethrich, 2011; Vervoort, 2013, 2019). This debate, famously initiated 
by Einstein and Bohr, is continued today most vividly in the interpretation of Bell’s theo-
1 On the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories the universe is ulti-
mately indeterministic (so probabilistic). But this matter is highly debated within the quantum philos-
ophy and quantum foundations community (Wuethrich, 2011; Vervoort, 2013, 2019). 
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rem. Bell’s theorem is generally believed to provide the strongest ‘purely physical’ argument 
against determinism; but there is now a consensus that this argument is actually heavily 
metaphysically tainted (cf. e.g. Wuethrich, 2011). Indeed, closer inspection shows that the 
standard interpretation of Bell’s theorem as refuting determinism is based on the assump-
tion that experimenters have ‘free will’ — precisely in the sense that their experimental 
choices are not determined by hidden physical causes (Wuethrich, 2011; Vervoort, 2013, 
2019; ‘t Hooft, 2017). But as many compatibilists have argued, free will can exist even if all 
events, including experimental choices of physicists, are causally predetermined. So remark-
ably enough, it seems that the standard interpretation of Bell’s theorem against determin-
ism smuggles in the assumption of no-determinism from the start. In sum, it is important 
for the free will debate to realize that the foundations of quantum physics leave the dichot-
omy determinism versus indeterminism undecided. And yet, it has recently been argued 
that, of both alternatives, determinism has the strongest explanatory power, in that it can 
provide a coherent answer to questions for which indeterminism remains entirely silent 
(Vervoort, 2019). This is, to us, an argument to seek for compatibilist models of free will. 
Of course, many compatibilists do not need physics to find a series of arguments in favour 
of determinism in philosophy or neuroscience. Let us here just note that the stakes are high 
in physics too, since Bell’s theorem can be seen as an essential obstacle in the construction 
of a ‘theory of everything’ (‘t Hooft, 2017). In order to debunk this obstacle, it is there-
fore important to provide arguments showing that free will makes sense also if the universe 
would be fully deterministic after all; an effort to which we wish to contribute in this arti-
cle.
In order to make our point that genuinely interdisciplinary work is needed for an inte-
grated understanding of free will, we will start by scrutinizing in Section 2 recent neurobio-
logical work, notably by Christof Koch (2009). The key question we wish to investigate in 
Section 2 is: does neurobiology offer arguments in favor of determinism or rather indeter-
minism? We focus on Koch’s work in his (2009), not only because he is a recognized expert 
on the matter, but also because he is already remarkably well-informed about the physics 
debate (Koch is a physicist turned neurobiologist). However we will argue that his inter-
pretation of neurobiological results presents lacunae in the philosophical and physical treat-
ment of the matters he investigates; we will conclude, pace Koch, that the neurobiological 
processes he considers bare a classic deterministic signature rather than an indeterminis-
tic quantum one (Section 2). Let us emphasize that Koch’s professional work is in the first 
place of neurobiological order; we do of course not doubt the high quality of this scientific 
work. In contrast to many or most of his colleagues from neurobiology, Koch is not a deter-
minist. We believe it is fair to consider him a libertarian adhering to a type of mind-mat-
ter dualism, a position that is close to, e.g., the position promoted by Popper and Eccles in 
their (1977), to whom Koch often refers (Eccles is a neurophysiologist and Nobel laure-
ate). Of course, Popper and Eccles are in a long philosophical tradition here. In particular, 
Koch believes in a mind that can somehow realize or ‘cause’ free actions; in any case he does 
not exclude this option, and searches for experimental support for this idea. After critical 
assessment of Koch’s interpretation of neurobiological data in his (2009), we attempt in 
Section 3 to answer the question of what else could be the basis for free will, if not a mind 
transcending the causal brain. We summarize in this Section the main ingredients of a min-
imal compatibilist model which we elaborated in detail elsewhere (Vervoort &  Blusiewicz, 
2020), and which draws on a biophilosophical account of consciousness developed by 
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Mahner and Bunge (1997). This model is analytically minimal in the sense that it aims to 
identify the minimal set of necessary and sufficient conditions to term an act ‘free-willed’ 
or ‘free’.23Most of the ingredients of this model have been theorized before; it could be seen 
as a condensed synthesis of previous compatibilist theories; yet, we push the analysis fur-
ther in some respects (cf. Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020; and Section 3.) Our main goals in 
the present article are 1) to apply our model to the paradigmatic Libet experiment on free 
will, and 2) to briefly describe further avenues of research that are suggested by it, in neuro-
biology and computer science. Both these goals are pursued in Section 4. Another goal is, as 
said, to scrutinize what we can learn from neurobiology regarding the (in)deterministic na-
ture of brain processes (Section 2).
We thus submit this investigation as a typical problem of naturalized or naturalistic 
philosophy. We not only borrow from natural science to inform our philosophical theoriz-
ing, but we also extract new avenues for further research in these sciences from our concep-
tual inquiry.
2. Neurobiology results, and their (in)deterministic interpretation
In this Section we summarize and comment on the experimental neurobiological find-
ings reported in (Koch, 2009) and other works, related to the (in)deterministic nature of 
neuronal processes. Koch in his (2009) searches for neurobiological properties that could 
support the libertarian concept of ‘free mind’. This implies that the author needs to find 
arguments for indeterminism in neurobiology (libertarians deny determinism and need in-
determinism for their account); in other words for the hypothesis that some relevant neu-
ronal processes escape from a clockwork causal structure of the brain and the universe. Let 
us first scrutinize the experimental facts Koch reports (2009). Then we will focus on their 
physical and philosophical interpretation.
2.1. Indeterminism in ionic channel currents
The units or bits of information on which neuronal communication is based are the so-
called ‘spikes’, or rather ‘action potentials’ emitted by neurons. Spikes or action potentials 
are trains of electric currents generated along the axons of the neurons. Neurobiological 
research has found that spike currents are constituted of the combination of many thou-
sands of smaller contributions, the latter being generated in microscopic ion channels that 
pass through the axon membrane. Now, while the spikes are, in the terminology of Koch 
(2009), “macroscopic, continuous and deterministic”, the smaller ionic currents are “mi-
croscopic, binary, and stochastic” (binary means fluctuating between ‘off’ (0) and ‘on’ (1), 
and stochastic means probabilistic, or random, i.e. indeterministic). Thus, the probabilis-
tic aspect of the ion currents resides here in the fact that the ‘on’ and ‘off’ domains arise in a 
probabilistic manner in time: there is no regular pattern in them — as is obvious from, for 
instance, the measured current profiles published in Koch (1999).
2 Our model is a two-component model. Distinguishing several components in free will is also done by 
Walter (2001); both models can be fruitfully compared, as done in (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020).
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Could this aspect of probabilistic behaviour provide the element of indeterminism (in 
our brain activity when making free choices) that the libertarian is looking for?
2.2. Indeterminism in spike frequency
A similar randomness occurs in the frequency of the action potentials. Koch (2009) re-
ports on experiments in which a micro-electrode is implanted close to a particular neuron 
in the cortex of a macaque monkey looking at a display of a randomly moving cloud of dots 
(see also Koch, 1999). (This projection ensures that the neuron’s activity is reasonably con-
stant over different experimental trials.) When the display is turned on, the neuron begins 
to ‘fire’, i.e. to emit spikes, at a frequency that can be measured via the electrode. Now, over 
different trials, the spikes are emitted in a random manner; more precisely, their tempo-
ral pattern varies unpredictably over the trials, but the average number of spikes remains 
reasonably constant. So one can define a probability of spike frequency. Here is again an 
indeterministic aspect of brain functioning and one can again ask: could this be the inde-
terminacy that allows our brain and our decision making to escape from the iron laws of bi-
ophysical determinism?
2.3. Indeterminism in fly behaviour
In the literature on the neurobiology of consciousness and free will, an important place is 
occupied by research investigating the behavior of model animals, notably the fruit fly (the 
famous and hard-working Drosophila melanogaster, inadvertently involved in the attribu-
tion of at least eight Nobel prizes). If the brains of flies were purely deterministic systems, 
one could expect that elementary behaviour (say flying in a straight line) in an environment 
presenting as little external stimuli as possible, would be very simple — say fully regular or 
perhaps fully random (‘fully random’ means: all movements having equal4probability3). 
Drosophila m. has decided otherwise: her behaviour appears to be highly complex, some-
where in between fully regular and fully random — she acts capriciously, ‘voluntarily’ as it 
were. This is shown by well-known experiments in which fruit flies are tethered to a rigid 
wire (receiving no visual impulses) and in which their ‘escape’ flights are registered while 
the animal can only turn left or right (Heisenberg and Wolf, 1984; Maye et al., 2007). The 
flies appear to execute stochastic saccades following a fractal pattern. In Koch’s words, “the 
animal behaves neither completely randomly nor fully deterministically, but opts for some-
thing in between chance and necessity” (Koch, 2009, p. 45). This ‘spontaneous’ complex 
behaviour is typically interpreted as (an embryonic form of) voluntary behaviour (Koch, 
2009, p. 45) — where we wish to remark that the concept of voluntariness is indeed closely 
related to that of free will, but that it is nonetheless far from easily definable, as will be seen 
in the next Section.
3 Fully random behaviour would reflect the fact that in experiments the flies are exposed to no struc-
tured external (visual) stimuli — in physical terms: only white noise (white noise is unstructured ran-
domness). If the brain were a simple deterministic input/output box, then ‘randomness in’ would 
cause ‘randomness out’. But things are not as simple. 
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2.4. Determinism in Libet-like experiments
Koch interprets the well-known neurobiological result of Libet (1985), which we will con-
sider in greater detail in the last Section, as indicating that “the brain can make a simple de-
cision well before the conscious mind does; this observation reveals the experience of will-
ing an action to be secondary to the actual cause” (Koch, 2009, p. 49). ‘The actual cause’ 
is the working of the brain. This is a quite standard interpretation — an interpretation 
that, as Koch concedes, is rather in agreement with determinism than with indeterminism. 
Modern versions of this experiment have confirmed Libet’s work based on electroenceph-
alography (EEG, e.g. Haggard and Eimer, 1999). A considerably more sophisticated tech-
nique, fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), has been used in experiments by 
e.g. Soon et al. (2008). These researchers monitored the brain activity of test persons who 
were asked to flex either their left or their right hand. Soon et al. reported that, by screen-
ing their hemodynamic activity in the parietal and prefrontal cortex, their choice could be 
predicted 8 seconds prior to the onset of movement45(!). Once more, there is a long time 
span of brain activity before the conscious choice is made.
Let us now scrutinize Koch’s and other typical interpretations of these scientific re-
sults. First of all, it should be noted that many philosophers agree that fundamental ran-
domness, or fundamental indeterminacy, is, in itself, not a hallmark of free decisions (cf. e.g. 
Pereboom, 1997; Walter, 2001; Dennett, 2003; Griffith, 2013). The argument generally 
used against the idea that indeterminism alone can ground free will is the so-called ‘luck 
argument’: if my actions are the result of an indeterministic process occurring in my brain 
that might very well not have occurred, it is hard to see how these actions are under my 
control and up to me (libertarians may contest this conclusion). At any rate, we take it that 
a libertarian, more precisely a ‘libertarian à la Koch’, looks for neuronal processes in hu-
mans that satisfy at least two criteria, L1 and L2, namely neuronal processes that:
L1) escape from the straightjacket of determinism, and at the same time,
L2)  can be somehow (freely and consciously) ‘influenced by the mind’ (cf. e.g. Koch, 
2009, p. 49) or ‘controlled by the mind’ (e.g. Koch, 2009, p. 41).
It is clear from Koch’s article that he focuses on the case of an immaterial mind (see e.g. 
Koch, 2009, p. 41, where he compares the mind to a ‘metaphysical ectoplasm’). What do 
biology and physics tell us about these requirements or hypotheses?
As exemplified by the results 2.1-2.3, there indeed exist indeterministic neuronal pro-
cesses that are or could be at the basis of our conscious behaviour (L1). But physicists im-
mediately add that the indeterminism of these specific processes corresponds to classical 
randomness, not quantum randomness (this is acknowledged by Koch). This is essential, 
because classical randomness is usually seen as deriving from deterministic, even if unpre-
dictable, processes. Only quantum indeterminacy is genuine, irreducible randomness, which 
cannot be reduced to underlying deterministic processes. Regarding empirical result 2.1, 
Koch (2009, p. 43) says: “Given the large size of channel proteins […] it is generally be-
lieved that the stochastic character of ionic channels can be entirely explained by thermal 
fluctuations and does not rely on quantum indeterminacy […]”. And regarding 2.2, the 
4 Some authors, however, criticize this result by pointing out that, depending on experimental condi-
tions, the predictions were only correct with a certain probability, not necessarily clearly significant.
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randomness and variability of action potentials of individual neurons: “Some of this var-
iability is due to trembling eyes, the exact timing of the heartbeat, breathing, and so on. 
The remaining unpredictability is thought to be accounted for by the incessant movement 
of the molecules, primarily water, making up the wet and warm brain — thermal motion 
[…]. This ceaseless motion cannot be predicted but is still subject to the laws of cause and 
effect. Biophysicists by and large believe that quantum mechanics has no essential role to 
play here. While nervous systems —like anything else— obey quantum mechanics, the col-
lective effects of all these molecules frenetically moving about is to smear out any quan-
tum indeterminacy. At the cellular level, neurons look to be firmly governed by classical 
physics” (2009, p. 43-44). This analysis is indeed in full agreement with what for instance 
quantum condensed matter physics and quantum chemistry teach us, namely that quan-
tum coherence and quantum phenomena in general are destroyed when atoms or mole-
cules are brought to temperatures above say liquid-nitrogen temperatures (an icy 77 Kelvin 
or –196º Celsius) — when thermal kinetic effects tune in. Something similar is true for the 
stochastic saccades following a fractal pattern observed on fruit flies (result 2.3): fractals are 
typically explained by the theory of non-linear systems, or deterministic chaos (Maye et al., 
2007).
So, neuronal phenomena 2.1-2.3 are usually understood as deriving from classic deter-
ministic processes, but at the same time they are unpredictable. This brings us to the heart 
of Koch’s analysis in his (2009). Indeed, on closer inspection, Koch takes the unpredicta-
bility of brain activity, well-illustrated by 2.1-2.3, as the key guarantee for the possibility of 
free will. He stresses on p. 45: “Your actions are not, and never will be, predictable. Even 
though the universe and everything within it obeys natural laws, the state of the future 
world is contingent in a way that, in general, cannot be computed from its current state”.
Now, there is little doubt that the detailed time-behaviour of ion channel currents, as 
well as of action potentials, as well as the features of many other (individual or collective) 
brain processes will for ever elude human prediction — we have, alas or luckily, too lim-
ited cognitive and epistemic means at our disposal for that. This unpredictability-in-prac-
tice is universally acknowledged in physics and philosophy. However, it is not considered a 
challenge to fundamental determinism, in other words, it does not amount to an (L1)-type 
argument for libertarianism. As recalled above in criterion (L1), a libertarian can only in-
terpret genuinely indeterministic neuronal activity as a basis for free will, not ‘just’ unpre-
dictable activity.56Most unpredictable systems in physics are still deterministic, determin-
istic chaos as reported in result 2.3 being the paradigm example. Only genuine quantum 
processes could satisfy (L1); but there is no evidence for these in the working of neurons. In 
sum, the unpredictability to which Koch points is decidedly not enough.
Koch seems to be aware of this problem for his account, since at times he speculates on 
the possibility that there still could exist relevant quantum processes in the brain. Let us 
bear with the author and concede this point: that it still might be possible, against the odds, 
that future biophysical research will find evidence for a truly quantum, irreducibly indeter-
ministic process involved in conscious brain activity. Koch envisages the following possibil-
ity (2009, p. 40): “What cannot be ruled out is that tiny quantum fluctuations deep in the 
5 A libertarian assumes that genuine alternatives are open to the mind, and therefore needs to find argu-
ments against the single-track necessity of determinism.
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brain are amplified by deterministic chaos and will ultimately lead to behavioral choices. 
This is the basis of Jordan’s quantum amplifier hypothesis of free will […]. The release of a 
single synaptic vesicle may be dependent on some pre-synaptic quantum event. This might 
generate an action potential in the post-synaptic neuron that, in turn, triggers a cascade of 
active neurons that ultimately give rise to movement.” This eighty-year-old ‘quantum am-
plifier’ hypothesis is indeed well-known, and was proposed by one of the founding fathers 
of quantum theory, the German physicist Pascual Jordan (Jordan, 1938).
Let us assume, for the time being, that the quantum amplifier hypothesis satisfies re-
quirement (L1). What about (L2)? Are there neurobiological indications that an imma-
terial mind could somehow control quantum processes (or processes generated by quan-
tum processes)? Koch speculates (2009, p. 41-42): “The only freedom that such a mind 
could have is to realize one quantum-mechanical event rather than another one as dictated 
by Schrödinger’s law. Say, for example, that at a particular point in time and at a particular 
synapse in cortex, a superposition of two quantum mechanical states occurs. There is a 10% 
chance that the synapse will switch —sending a chemical signal across the cleft separating 
two neurons— and a 90% chance that nothing happens. […] Given our present interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, it cannot be ruled out that the conscious mind could ex-
ploit this idiosyncratic freedom. It is powerless to change these probabilities —that would 
cost energy— but it might be able to decide what happens on any one trial. […] We do not 
know whether this is even within the realm of the possible. But at least it cannot be ruled 
out”. The ‘idiosyncratic freedom’ Koch refers to is the capacity of the mind to choose be-
tween quantum states in superposition (while leaving the experimentally verifiable proba-
bilities unaltered).
We fear however that the possibility that Koch envisages here runs more against what 
physics teaches us than he claims. Quantum processes are indeed probabilistic and it is fully 
legitimate to assume that they are characterized by several outcomes or states (say switching 
or not switching, as above) and that these states arise each with a certain probability. How-
ever, physics offers no support for the idea that ‘something immaterial’ could influence a 
quantum system in the brain and cause it to assume a certain state rather than another one. 
Indeed, to cause a quantum system to assume a state (in physics terms: to cause the wave func-
tion to collapse on some state) amounts to an interaction, and interactions inevitably cost 
energy. But the principle of conservation of energy applied to the brain, in other words the 
energy balance of the brain, does not leave room for such an extraneous immaterial agent — 
the energy balance of the material brain is in equilibrium. Therefore, the (L2)-type of argu-
ment Koch invokes —the possibility of an immaterial substance choosing among quantum 
states— contradicts one of the most fundamental laws of nature, namely the energy conser-
vation principle.67This adds of course to the fact that, till date, there is no other biological nor 
physical evidence that could back-up the existence of a mind beyond the brain. To be fair, we 
should remark that Koch is himself all but adamant in defending his mind-model; he seems 
well aware that it remains, from a scientific perspective, a highly speculative option.
Let us now draw our conclusion, based on the neurobiological data and models pre-
sented by Koch and others. We believe it is fair to say that there exists, till date, no suffi-
6 Somewhat surprisingly, at times Koch seems to be aware of this fact: see his correct observations on the 
principle of energy conservation (Koch, 2009, p. 41). 
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cient neurobiological nor physical evidence to support the idea of libertarianism based on 
(L1) (in short, quantum indeterminacy) and (L2) (in short, a controlling mind). As neu-
robiologists and biophysicists have argued, neuronal systems are too large and too hot for 
quantum effects to survive; and the arguments for an immaterial mind that could control 
quantum states seem even more doubtful to us. Also, the experiments performed by Libet 
and others (e.g. Soon et  al., 2008, findings 2.4 above) are usually interpreted as in agree-
ment with determinism rather than with indeterminism (of course, libertarians have con-
tested this conclusion, since this is a debatable matter).
Guided by the above conclusions, as well as by philosophical arguments (notably the 
mentioned ‘luck argument’) and by physics results (Vervoort, 2013, 2019), we will adopt in 
the following a deterministic or rather compatibilist position on free will. We have elabo-
rated our compatibilist model of free will elsewhere (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020). Let us 
summarize and illustrate our findings in the next Section, and then show in Section 4 how 
they deal with Libet’s experiment and which avenues of research they suggest.
3. A minimal compatibilist model of free will: the CMT model
Let us first state our main background assumptions. First of all, we adhere in the follow-
ing to ‘materialist-emergentist realism’ essentially as it is expounded in (Walter, 2001) and 
in most detail in (Mahner and Bunge, 1997); for a summary see (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 
2020, Section 5). This implies in particular that we assume that mental activity is brain 
activity: our thoughts, beliefs, choices, feelings etc., have a neurological, and ultimately 
chemical-physical basis in the brain; mental states correspond to neural (super)networks, 
mental acts are brain processes. As recalled in (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020), we follow 
Mahner and Bunge in their characterization of the ‘mind’ (of agent A) as a conceptual ob-
ject, namely the union, or set, of all mental processes of the brain of A (Mahner and Bunge, 
1997, p. 205). Further, this view implies, notably, that: “There can be no mind-matter in-
teraction because —unlike individual mental processes and brains— mind and matter are 
sets, hence conceptual objects. However, it does make sense to speak of ‘mental-bodily in-
teractions’ provided this expression is taken to abbreviate ‘interactions among plastic neu-
ronal systems, on the one hand, and either committed neuronal systems or bodily systems 
that are not part of the Central Neuronal System on the other’ (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, 
p. 205).
Next, we follow in this article most philosophers in the assumption that ‘free will’ is 
‘free will necessary for moral responsibility’ (note that the present article is about free will, 
not moral responsibility; but for completeness we present a concise view on the latter con-
cept in the Appendix). Thus the free will we study here is ‘more’ than animal free will, if 
such a thing exists. But let us immediately add: from a neurobiological point of view, it is 
natural to assume that if something like free will exists, there should be a smooth evolution-
ary transition from an embryonic form of free will in animals to a higher-grade species in 
humans (cf. e.g. Brembs, 2011). As we will see in a moment, the conceptual model of free 
will we proposed in (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020) allows for this smooth evolution.
In philosophy, a position intermediate between libertarianism and hard determin-
ism, called compatibilism, assumes that free will and determinism are not in contradiction 
(for a general introduction, cf. e.g. Ayer, 1954/1997; Pereboom, 1997; Walter, 2001; Den-
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nett, 2003; Griffith, 2013). Many and perhaps a majority of philosophers studying free 
will are compatibilists (Pereboom, 1997, p. 242). Let us immediately clarify: the free will 
of the compatibilist model presented below is not the absolute free will of an independent 
mind or agent in which a libertarian à la Koch believes — a mind or agent with the capac-
ity to choose between genuine alternatives independently of prior causes. If determinism is 
true, such ontologically fundamental alternatives do not exist, as already argued by Spinoza. 
But what could then be this type of free will that is compatible with determinism? This re-
mains an open question in philosophy, but it appears that a thorough literature search and 
a synthesis of popular, cogent theories brings us quite far. This is essentially what we did 
in (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020); there we argue that our model solves problems of other 
theories, so that we can have a relative confidence in it.
Many compatibilists agree that an essential ingredient of free-willed actions is the con-
dition that they are not compelled by an external agent (see e.g. Ayer, 1954/1997; this idea 
traces back to Aristotle, Hobbes and others). But even more essential is, as realized already 
by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, that a free-willed act should be voluntary. To ana-
lyze the complex concept of voluntariness we relied on a detailed neurobiological theory 
developed in Mahner and Bunge (1997). Without going in details, voluntary can be ana-
lyzed as purposeful and conscious; and for consciousness Mahner and Bunge propose fol-
lowing definition (in a slightly modified phrasing, cf. Mahner and Bunge, 1997 p. 209):
DEF-1. A conscious mental process / choice / act (conceived as based on, governed by, a men-
tal process) is a mental process / choice / act that is monitored (recorded, analyzed, controlled, or 
kept track of) by some other mental activity in the same brain.
In other words, in essence: for a mental process or act to be conscious, it must be thought 
about by a higher-level part of the brain, typically thought of as being localized in the pre-
frontal cortex. This leads then to following definition of a free act (Mahner and Bunge, 
1997; Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020):
DEF-2. Action A by animal b is ‘free-willed’ or ‘free’ (is made of b’s own free will) IFF
ii. the action A is unconstrained (no programmed or external compulsion), and
ii. the action A is purposeful and conscious in that the action (linked to a mental process) is 
monitored (recorded, analyzed, controlled, or kept track of) by some other mental activity 
in the brain of b.
Clause (i), no programmed or external compulsion, refers to the absence of direct or pro-
grammed constraint by external agents (as well as of pathological or compulsory internal 
constraint, see e.g. Ayer, 1954/1997). For the following, it is condition (ii) that will be seen 
to be essential.
But now we can, it seems, go further in our conceptual analysis.78How, by what means, 
does the brain ‘monitor’ (i.e. record, analyze, control, or keep track of) mental activities as 
ideas, perceptions etc.? In (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020) we propose that this monitor-
7 Pushing this analysis further is necessary to allow our model to interact more fruitfully with special 
sciences, including proposing new experiments, notably in neurobiology and computer science (see the 
last Section). 
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ing always involves some assumptions, beliefs, worldviews or other cognitive tools (besides 
perhaps other brain states). For instance, when ‘freely’ deciding which suit to choose to go 
to work, I may ‘assume’ or I may ‘use the belief’ or ‘be in the belief’ that suit A is more ap-
propriate for today’s work than suit B. Or when deciding of my own free will to help my 
neighbor, I may base my decision on the worldview or ‘theory’ that altruism is a source of 
fulfillment, or on the simple belief that the act will be rewarded by something much more 
mundane — say a babble plus beer. It seems that the more intellectually demanding the 
context is, the more elaborate the assumptions I adopt are: in some cases these better be 
part of a well-grounded theory. For instance, when a spaceship commander decides in an 
unforeseen situation to freely press the ‘full power’ button at a precise time, he hopefully 
does so on the basis of assumptions that take serious calculations and relativistic mechan-
ics into account. (If he does not, and hits the button in a panicky reflex, one hesitates to call 
his act genuinely free — in agreement with almost all philosophical models.) In the follow-
ing we use ‘theory’ in a very broad sense, including high-level theories (ethical, philosoph-
ical, sociological, political, physical…) but more generally also assumptions; beliefs systems, 
including every-day beliefs and hypotheses; bodies of information; worldviews; etc. In 
(Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020) we introduced ‘theory*’ to define theory in this broad sense; 
we could equally well have used ‘assumptions*’ or ‘beliefs*’.89Now, it seems that one always 
monitors, analyzes and controls an act, choice or decision with reference to, or within, a the-
ory*, as illustrated by the above examples. In sum, high-level free acts, when non-trivial in-
tellectual or ethical deliberation is asked, involve conscious monitoring by means of assump-
tions, beliefs or theories. This is the key new ingredient of our model. But this ingredient still 
needs to be supplemented with following stipulation.
Indeed, the theories* involved in monitoring an act are more or less ‘adequate’. One 
ponders about a choice using beliefs that may be ill-guided or solid, (more or less) rational 
or irrational; and in non-trivial situations the whole art of making adequate free decisions 
amounts, according to our model, to using adequate assumptions, beliefs or theories. This 
interpretation comes close to what Kant thought about free will in his Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. There he states: “a free will and a will under moral laws become one 
and the same” (Kant, 1786/1983 BA98). For Kant, real free will is, in essence, will under 
moral law. Translated in the language of our model: will in accordance with (monitored, 
controlled by) adequate moral assumptions / theories*.
8 Perhaps the most essential reason why we introduce the convention ‘theory*’ rather than ‘assumption*’ 
or ‘belief*’ is that, when relating our account to computer science, it appears clearly more instrumental 
to focus on theories. So the concept ‘theory*’ allows us to interface with computer science in a much 
more relevant way: see the last Section. Moreover, we believe it is important to make a distinction be-
tween what could be termed ‘simple’ or ‘elementary’ beliefs (e.g. linked to perceptions), and beliefs 
that involve diverse or elaborate cognitive elements (or elaborate mental content) such as theories. In 
cognitively demanding contexts, an agent cannot monitor a choice through the lens of a simple belief, 
but needs a whole theory —or many coherent beliefs— to assess a situation. Further, we know since 
Quine and his holism that statements, at least somewhat complicated ones, in any case scientific ones, 
do usually not get their meaning ‘in isolation’ but through interconnection with a net of statements 
(so diverse mental content) — a theory* in our jargon. One might say: for complicated free decisions, 
an agent may need to integrate several beliefs (constituting a coherent whole).
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A relevant feature of the CMT model is that it is in agreement with the idea that free 
will comes in degrees.9As said, within a neurobiological conception of free will there cer-
tainly is room for variations in free will, as has been argued by neurobiologists (Brembs, 
2011). Indeed, if such a thing as free will exists, then we arguably do not possess it as a foe-
tus, but we gradually acquire it with age and cognitive evolution. The variability of free will 
can also be understood, within a neurobiological perspective, as a direct consequence of the 
fact that we descended from animals that had, at best, an embryonic form of free will; ours 
evolved in parallel and gradually with our cognitive capacities. This is well reflected in our 
model: according to it, the variability of free will resides, notably, in the degree of adequacy of 
the assumptions* we use to consciously monitor and guide our actions; so in their (cognitive 
and practical) efficiency (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020). It seems clear that low-level ani-
mals are devoid of this form of free will; but it is highly likely that in primates some elemen-
tary forms of consciousness exist, as an evolutionary base for human consciousness. In our 
model this embryonic consciousness comes down to a capacity to guide actions through 
some elementary form of ‘beliefs’ or ‘assumptions’. Therefore we suggest it would be inter-
esting to search for the neuronal correlates for ‘assumptions’ in primates (one conjectures 
that they are related to memory-circuits, or to the ‘mirror neurons’ that have become fash-
ionable lately10).
We can wrap-up above considerations in the final definition that summarizes our 
model (cf. Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020):
DEF-3. Action A by animal b is ‘free-willed’ or ‘free’ (is made of b’s own free will)
IFF
ii. the action A is unconstrained (no programmed or external compulsion), and
ii. the action A is conscious in that the action (linked to a mental process) is monitored (re-
corded, analyzed, controlled, or kept track of) by some other mental activity in the brain 
of b. The latter monitoring occurs through theories*, which have a varying degree of ade-
quacy (cf. explanation in text).
For examples how to apply this definition to concrete cases, we refer to the last Section (see 
notably how we treat the example involving Alice and Bob) and to the original (Vervoort 
& Blusiewicz, 2020). In the latter article we have shown that our model, which we term the 
CMT model (for free-willed as ‘conscious-through-monitoring-through-theories*’) can 
be related to, and solve problems of, several recent compatibilist theories, notably those of 
Frankfurt (1969, 1988), Wolf (1990), and Fischer and Ravizza (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998; 
Fischer et al., 2007). Let us consider one example from (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020). In 
Frankfurt’s ‘hierarchical mesh theory’ of free will (1969, 1988) an action or choice A is free 
if it meshes with a ‘second-order volition’ — a higher desire about the first-order desire to 
do A. Then A is really (rationally) desired, in agreement with one’s second-order (rational) 
 9 This idea is not new in the philosophy literature. It is for instance elaborated upon in an interesting 
manner in (O’Connor, 2009). Here we propose a related but still different account of the origin of the 
variability of free will.
10 It is interesting that these mirror neurons are the base for the ‘theory of mind’ that neurobiologists 
have attributed to primates as the cognitive base for recognizing the ‘self’ and ‘the other’. 
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desires; action A flows from the ‘will one wants’ — a reflective capacity animals likely do 
not have. As argued in (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020), there surely is a relevant connection 
between Frankfurt’s theory and the CMT model: one may consider that second-order voli-
tions are part of the general beliefs, worldviews etc. that an agent uses to guide and control 
her life and actions. Action A meshes with a second-order volition in that it is consciously 
monitored by (assessed, analyzed etc.) with help of a worldview, a belief system, assump-
tions of life, in other words theories*. So both models converge, but ours is not afflicted for 
instance with the well-known infinite-regress problem of Frankfurt’s; and ours can treat 
a case as brainwashing, again a threat to Frankfurt’s theory (for a recent overview and ref-
erences, see Griffith, 2013, Ch. 4). A girl Trina brainwashed by her community to believe 
that stealing is commendable may well act in accordance with higher volitions, really be-
lieve in what she does, and therefore be entirely free according to Frankfurt’s model — a 
conclusion most people would disagree with. The CMT model solves this problem: Trina 
is brainwashed and therefore not unconstrained; and she monitors (assesses) her deeds 
through questionable, likely inadequate beliefs. In other words, one could say she has a lim-
ited or corrupted form of free will (Vervoort & Blusiewicz, 2020).
A last property of the CMT model that deserves remembering is that it is compati-
ble with a deterministic picture of the world. Indeed, even if all events, systems and proper-
ties of physical or biological or other nature were ultimately governed by iron deterministic 
laws, leaving no room to chance, free will could still exist — namely as a capacity of agents 
to act as defined by DEF-3. Indeed, even if we were living in a deterministic universe, an 
agent can act without being constrained by other agents, and monitor her acts through 
conscious theories*. Of course, the acquisition or adoption or application of beliefs, assump-
tions etc. will, in a deterministic picture, be the result of predetermined processes, medi-
ated through genetics, education, social background, life-changing encounters etc. — in 
any particular case by a potentially quasi-infinite number of particular causes (let us term 
this claim ‘source determinism’). But this is clearly not in opposition with the fact that one 
can evaluate an act through the lens of clauses (i) and (ii) in DEF-3, and judge whether it 
is free in that sense. Note, and this is interesting, that our model can also survive in an inde-
terministic universe! Also in that case one can evaluate an act according to (i) and (ii). So, 
our model could perhaps also appeal to libertarians and be used by them (but they would 
want to add something to it). But the model jibes best with a deterministic stance on free 
will. Indeed, the deterministic picture is the simplest: it does not need to invoke an ‘agent’ 
or ‘mind’ or other substance that would causally control a person’s acts; in the determinis-
tic picture acts are causally controlled by a person’s beliefs, assumptions (cf. clause (ii)) —
something cognitive—, where this cognitive thing (neural nets ultimately) is itself part of a 
deterministic causal chain. But these neural nets are still in the brain of some agent; agency 
comes back in in this way.
In any case, a comprehensive analysis of free will demands a commitment to either de-
terminism or indeterminism, as we will argue below. Therefore, to be precise, let us explic-
itly add the following ingredient to the CMT model as a compatibilist model. We do not 
simply assume that determinism and free will are not in contradiction (on the logical level) 
as all compatibilists do; we assume moreover that both exist in this world. Many contem-
porary compatibilist philosophers make no ontological commitments; but we need to do 
so when interpreting neurobiology and real-world cases. One could call this a form of ‘on-
tic compatibilism’ or ‘soft determinism’. We prefer the former, new term to emphasize the 
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perspectival dimension of this position (‘soft determinism’ is already used and does not 
explicitly contain this dimension). Indeed, one can look at problems of free will, agency, 
moral responsibility etc. through the lens of a theory of free will, but at the same time one 
should not forget, according to our ontic compatibilism, to analyze things through the 
lens of determinism. This position, intimately linked to (versions of) perspectivism, surely 
has been advocated in the history of philosophy. In sum, our model of free will, the CMT 
model, has three essential characteristics, namely DEF-3, featuring notably the assumption 
that the monitoring (analyzing, controlling) by the conscious brain involves assumptions, 
beliefs, theories*; the hypothesis that free will comes in degrees (this is actually already ex-
plicit in clause (ii) of DEF-3); and ontic compatibilism.
4. Libet’s experiment and the CMT model. Conclusions
We have analyzed in this article neurobiological results related to free will as reviewed in 
(Koch, 2009); more precisely results on the (in)deterministic nature of neuronal prop-
erties that can be analyzed in physical terms, namely ionic channel currents, spike fre-
quency, and fly behaviour (cf. Section 2, findings 2.1-2.3). In Section 2 we came to the 
conclusion that the biophysical processes involved do not provide evidence for genuine 
(quantum) indeterminacy. This is one of the reasons why we expressed a preference for 
a compatibilist model of free will, as sketched in the previous Section (one can also in-
voke philosophical and even physical arguments, cf. Vervoort, 2019). Even if all neuronal 
activity is based on deterministic (even if in practice unpredictable) processes, as pres-
ent-day scientific research seems to privilege, the CMT model sketched above is compat-
ible with that reality, and leaves room for (some form of) free will. But as noted, the core 
of the CMT model (DEF-3) would also survive if free decisions would involve indeter-
ministic processes, after all.
Let us, then, have a closer look at Libet’s experiment and its modern variants. In this 
experiment an EEG scan is made on the scalp of a test person. Such an EEG monitors the 
so-called ‘readiness potential’, which is an electrical signal (often called ‘brain waves’), ex-
pressed in Volts, that results from firing neurons. Every voluntary action, such as the flex-
ing of a hand, induces such a slowly rising electrical potential. In Libet’s experiment the test 
persons are asked to spontaneously lift or flex their hand, whenever they feel like it, and 
note the time when they make this ‘free’ decision. The experimental set-up is such that test 
persons can quite precisely identify this decision time (they look at a screen with a bright 
point moving on a circle, a clock, and can thus simply report the position of the pointer); 
the actual time of movement can be measured electrically with high precision; both times 
coincide quite well. As is well-known, the at-the-time quite spectacular result reported by 
Libet was that the EEG showed that the brain activity started almost half a second before 
the time at which the test person consciously decided to move. In Koch’s words: “What be-
came apparent was that the beginning of the readiness potential preceded the conscious de-
cision to move by [between] 0.3 and 0.5 sec. That is, the brain acted before the conscious 
mind did! This is a complete reversal of the deeply held intuition of mental causation — 
your brain and your body only act after your mind wills it” (2009, p. 46). Experiments like 
these have been confirmed by others; and one has to add to these findings the even more 
spectacular experiments by researchers as Soon et al. (2008).
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Many, and probably most neurobiologists are inclined to believe that these findings 
undermine the idea that humans have a free will. What is the verdict of the CMT model? 
The precise question is: is the test persons’ act of flexing their wrist ‘free’ (at the decision 
time)? Applying our model is straightforward here: at the decision time the test person is 
not constrained (condition (i) is satisfied) and she is clearly conscious of her act (condi-
tion (ii) is satisfied) — hence her act is free, after all, according to our model. (Before the de-
cision time the act is unconscious and therefore not free; but that seems uncontroversial.) 
Of course, deciding to flex a hand in a Libet experiment is almost a reflex-like act; therefore 
the ‘assumptions’ accompanying this kind of conscious decision are surely minimal and not 
particularly rationalized.11 But let us recall that free will comes in degrees; some acts involve 
a higher level or simply a different kind of consciousness than others; one could therefore 
say that the type of free will exerted by the test persons in flexing their hand is of a ‘mini-
mal’ type. Also, the steady rise in readiness potential that is measured in Libet’s experiment 
might be paralleling precisely this rise of awareness, of consciousness that an act is done — 
in agreement with our model.
Thus, on the CMT model, the test person in the Libet-experiments is free at the mo-
ment of conscious choice, even if this conscious and free act may well be determined by 
previous causes — as the neurobiological data suggest. In other words, Libet-like exper-
iments do not exclude a compatibilist conception of free will. This conclusion is in line 
with compatibilist ideas12 — it is on the other hand at odds with what many neuroscien-
tists believe. However, our model allows to go further in the analysis. As will be no sur-
prise, to that end it is instrumental to look at actions that are more complex, cognitively 
speaking, than the wrist flexing used in Libet’s experiment. Let us look at a somewhat sub-
tle test case. Imagine a family that has since generations amassed considerable wealth. Sup-
pose that the two off-springs in the youngest generation of the dynasty, Alice and Bob, 
are in a bitter fight since years about their heritage. Alice and Bob have been brought up 
in a family that puts material wealth among the highest goods; they were under the con-
stant influence of ideas, habits, events that expressed this ‘worldview’. (Although they 
surely experienced the idiosyncrasies of this select micro-cosmos, they do not seem to suf-
fer from any obvious, extreme psychopathological disorders.) Suppose further that Bob 
wants to inherit alone his family’s wealth, and decides to shoot his sister (over the years he 
has come to hate Alice, convinced as he is that she has tricked him out of a considerable 
part of the heritage; he seems to have convinced himself of the idea that Alice somehow 
deserves her fate). Suppose finally that Bob is also a drug addict, and that at the moment 
11 The ‘assumptions’ may be related to the assumption/belief that “I am a test person and supposed to 
flex”; to memories of former wrist flexing; to the memory or belief that the flexing can be done clock-
wise or counter-clockwise; etc.
12 For instance Ayer’s (1954/1997). Indeed, Libet’s test persons are not under external constraint (nei-
ther under pathological or compulsory internal constraint); hence free on Ayer’s model. Ayer famously 
argues that free will should not be contrasted with determinism and causality, but with constraint 
(Ayer, 1954/1997, p 115). See also Griffith’s monograph on free will (Griffith, 2013, p. 109): “RP 
[readiness potential] onset could correlate with any number of things. It could be some sort of precur-
sor to an intention. It could be a cause of an intention rather than an intension itself. This is impor-
tant because it may not be problematic to think that our intentions have causes (you will recall that 
most of the free will theories we have discussed allow for a causal chain)”.
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of killing he is under influence, but still —at least partly— lucid. Is Bob’s killing an act of 
free will?
On a straightforward application of the CMT model (DEF-3), Bob can be said to 
have (a form of) free will. Indeed, Bob was not compelled by others in his decision mak-
ing, or let us suppose so (clause (i) is satisfied); and he was guiding his act by some (more 
or less) conscious thinking (clause (ii)). Now, as argued in Section 3, a richer perspective 
can be given to this question by realizing that free will comes in degrees, and that the con-
scious monitoring of free acts is done within assumptions* or theories* having a degree of 
adequacy. From this perspective, even without taking his drug use into account, the free will 
of Bob may be said to be of a ‘corrupted’ type — at least if we agree that Bob’s belief that 
“money is all what counts” and that “she deserves it” are not the most adequate theory* to 
adopt.
But this is not all. Ontic compatibilism, the third main characteristic of our model, in-
cites us to scrutinize Bob’s decisions through the lens of determinism. Determinism is not 
only compatible with the two components of DEF-3, it is also at the source of these ingre-
dients of free will (we termed this ‘source determinism’ above) — or so suspects the deter-
minist. In Bob’s case it seems clear that there exist some drugs-mediated deterministic pro-
cesses underlying his decision making. Even if one cannot fully analyze why Bob believed 
what he believed (a great number of factors will have conditioned his beliefs, presumably 
starting in childhood), it can be assumed that his drug abuse will have influenced (so par-
tially determined) his assumptions and beliefs when deciding to murder his sister. For in-
stance, a euphoric or ‘counterfactually confident’ person makes different decisions than a 
normal person. So Bob’s drug use further distorted his free will through distorting his be-
liefs, assumptions and worldview; this is a free-will reducing factor that deterministically 
underlies condition (ii) in DEF-3. His drugs use could also be seen as a deterministic free-
will reducing factor for condition (i), if it leads to compulsory behaviour; and high-grade 
free will is devoid of inner or programmed compulsion according to clause (i) (cf. e.g. Ayer, 
1954/1997).
At the same time —and this surely is the counterintuitive part of our interpretation—, 
according to the nomological determinism we favour, Bob had to do what he did — for each 
and every one of his acts. When taking all physical data of the universe into account, sub 
specie aeternitatis so to speak, he had no real choice (supposing determinism is true) — even 
if to our and to his subjective minds this seems unbelievable at almost all instances of per-
ceived choice. Similarly, on the interpretation of the neurobiological experiments of Sec-
tion 2 we favour, there is little room for quantum indeterminacy in cognitive processes, and 
even less for a mind determining quantum processes. On that interpretation, what neuro-
biology leaves us with are classic deterministic processes materialized through action poten-
tials of active neurons. These neurobiological processes, causing some free act, are the ma-
terial counterpart of ‘beliefs’ or ‘reasons’ that make us pick a choice, act a free act. In Bob’s 
case these processes were moreover conditioned by drugs. (One could see this as a further 
argument for determinism: if some decisions are ultimately depending on the deterministic 
chemistry and physics of the brain — why not all?)
Therefore, to be precise, we should give a detailed answer to the question “had Bob 
free will?”. All depends on what one calls free will. If the ultimate capacity of a mind exerting 
power over the brain is meant, a mind that can thus genuinely choose between alternatives, 
independently of the causal past, our answer is ‘no’ — at present we find little or no scien-
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tific evidence for such a capacity. But if a CMT-type capacity is meant, a capacity to think 
about one’s acts and thus to guide and control them, we believe the answer is ‘yes’. Our 
analysis of the question of free will hints to a final conclusion that is quite close to what 
philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Spinoza taught us, namely that it is through 
better understanding the world that we become freer beings.13 (Regarding the question 
whether Bob was morally responsible: cf. the Appendix.)
As announced, one essential motivation we had for constructing an analytically min-
imal model of free will (DEF-3), is that we believe that it can be instrumental for guid-
ing natural science research; it may suggest a number of avenues for research in neurosci-
ence and computer science. Indeed, we conjecture that our model can be instrumental in 
tackling questions related to consciousness — considered an essential but at the same time 
highly elusive concept in neuroscience (e.g. Stern, 2017). Notably, our model could pos-
sibly conceptualize aspects of consciousness and free will that could have an empirical ba-
sis. We think here in the first place of the process of monitoring by a neuronal superstruc-
ture (presumably in the prefrontal cortex, or having an integrating ‘central unit’ there) that 
should represent a theory*; and the neuronal correlates of embryonic forms of ‘beliefs’ or 
‘assumptions*’ in primates. We suggest it would be interesting to investigate whether such 
superstructures are active in decision making and conscious acts; and of which nature they 
precisely are.
In computer science, in particular AI research, a much debated question is: can future 
computers and robots be conscious and/or have free will? If possible at all, our model sug-
gests that one of the key properties a computer or an artificial neural net should have to 
emulate consciousness, or to approximately mimic it, is the capacity to ‘use’ higher-order 
theories — and this notably includes the capacity to adequately apply theories to real-world 
situations and to act accordingly. Some will conclude we are very far from this possibility. 
This suggests the following line of research in computer science and AI: can machines learn 
to acquire and use theories*, and which types and how?
Intriguingly, computer scientists and cognitive scientists have recently indeed pro-
posed that mastering theories is a key goal for artificial intelligence (AI). Lake et al. (2017) 
state in the abstract of their highly cited article:
“We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and think-
ing machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and 
how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (1) build causal models of the 
world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recogni-
tion problems; (2) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology to support and 
enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (3) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to 
rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations.”
So, developing the capacity to acquire and use theories is, according to these authors, the 
most promising path that AI can take to emulate human cognition. Since we come to a 
converging conclusion (about rational consciousness, arguably strongly related to cogni-
13 Of course, this research also suggests that concepts as blame, praise, desert, punishment, achievement, 
pride, self-made man etc. need to be taken with a serious grain of salt, and actually seriously revised — 
a topic for much more philosophy.
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tion) from a very different angle, namely from philosophical research on the ancient ques-
tion of free will, we submit this as a case of mutual corroboration.
In physics, finally, a compatibilist view on free will allows us to escape from Bell’s no-go 
theorem, as argued in Section 1. This may be important, since (the usual interpretation 
of) Bell’s theorem is an obstacle in the construction of a ‘theory of everything’ (‘t Hooft, 
2017). We hope that we have hereby made a case for naturalized philosophy, by showing 
how philosophy and natural sciences can interact in a bi-directional way.
Appendix. A few words on moral responsibility
Almost all philosophers agree that the concept of moral responsibility is closely related to 
that of free will, and that free will is necessary for moral responsibility, but the precise link 
is highly debated. We cannot elaborate in detail here on this link, but it seems that exam-
ples as Bob’s case force us to envisage following hypothesis: while free will comes in degrees, 
moral responsibility is rather an all-or-nothing concept. (Sure, there may be a variability 
and degree attached to moral responsibility too, but, as we will argue now, to a lesser ex-
tent than to free will.) From some point of view, moral responsibility is a concept that car-
ries the idea of a status that a society of people attributes to each of its members in order 
that it can function acceptably. On the CMT model, if there is no constraint, free will is 
largely only depending on some capacity of the free-willed agent herself (namely to ‘CMT’). 
But one may argue that moral responsibility seems rather like a status given by society. In-
deed, in the literature moral responsibility is defined by such concepts as answerability, at-
tributability, accountability (cf. e.g. Watson, 1996; Smith, 2012) — these all have a legalis-
tic touch to them, while DEF-3 is devoid of such concepts. Free will is something one can 
have on an island alone; the last man to live can have free will; but one hesitates to attrib-
ute moral responsibility to the last human in the universe — the last human can in any case 
not be morally responsible with regard to another human. One is morally responsible with 
regard to X (normally: other people, perhaps other living species); free will does not carry 
this relativity. It thus seems that having moral responsibility normally involves taking soci-
ety into account; having free will not necessarily, e.g. in morally neutral situations. To come 
back to our starting point: we believe this is the reason why moral responsibility is rather an 
all-or-nothing concept, much less a matter of degree than free will: society attributes it to 
any agent as soon as she has just a little free will (just a little of the capacity to consciously 
monitor acts). On this view, moral responsibility is attributed by implicit fiat of society, 
not so differently as it attributes e.g. ‘citizenship of nation X’ — clearly an all-or-nothing 
thing. A moderate hypothesis is the following: that the variability of moral responsibility 
does not parallel that of free will. While an agent’s free will can in principle vary gradually 
with time, act-by-act so to speak, an agent is morally responsible for his acts once and for 
all, as soon as he has a minimum form of free will.
Hence our verdict: Bob in the above case study is morally responsible.
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